Health and Security in Special Events
CONCID the Road to the 2010 Games

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"The city of Mayagüez will host the 2010 Caribbean and Central American (CCA) Games. Said event will bring athletes and visitors from other countries as well as from within. CONCID has considered the risks and vulnerabilities that come with being the host of such a SPECIAL EVENT."

Dra. Abigail Matos Pagán

Are we prepared to receive the athletes and visitors for the 2010 CCA games?

Will we be able to ensure the public that they will enjoy the benefits of a secure and safe environment throughout their stay?

Both of these questions can be answered with the following quote …

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

George Santayana

After the terrorists' attacks of September 11, 2001, the public refused to attend sport events because of fear for their safety and opted to watch them at home on Pay-Per View. *Sine Qua Non … without adequate security, there is no attendance and without attendance, there is no revenue …!*

Perfect security is a myth. Terrorists and criminals are always looking for vulnerabilities they can exploit. Nevertheless, by studying, analyzing and applying the lessons learned in past incidents, preparation and mitigation could be enough to dissuade potential threats as terrorists much rather go after a soft target. This article will explain what is terrorism, the origins of modern terrorism, the terrorist acts of the 1972 Munich Olympics, as well as lessons learned from this event and how said lessons has been applied to improve security in special events

Before venturing into the area of Security in Mega Sport Events, it is important to know what terrorism is. "Terrorism is the illegal use—or the threat of use—of violence against individuals or properties with the purpose of coercing or intimidating governments, or societies with the end of achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives."

Terrorism has nothing to do with religion and everything to do with power. In 680 A. D. Shi'ite wanted Muhammad's successor to be from his blood line. In order to frustrate this initiative, Sunni Muslims assassinated Hussein—Muhammad's grandson—in Karbala, Southern Iraq. The reason …? To maintain political control of the region.

Modern Terrorism

To understand terrorism, it is important to know how and where Modern Terrorism originated. Modern terrorism originated from the antagonism that exists between Israel and Arabs. In 1890 European Jews arrived in what is known today as Palestine. They found that the territory was occupied by the Turks. The Arabs sought after the Israelis' help to remove them form the region. They agreed to assist; however, they also demanded to have a territory of their own.

At the arrival of WWI, the British whom occupied the territory, also wanted to run the Turks from the region, they promised the Arabs that in exchange for their help they would allow them greater autonomy. To the Israelis they promised a national territory and to the French they promised they would share control of the region. Nevertheless, the only promised that was kept was the one made to France.

In 1936, the Jews began their struggle for a territory of their own—this was immediately opposed by the Arabs. The Arabs opposition was so strong and violent; the Jews founded a resistance movement called "Irgun Zeva'i Le'umi." In search of a peaceful solution to this dilemma, the British formed what is known as the "Peel Commission." This commission decided that Israelis and Arabs could not co-exist and that the only solution was to divide the place between the Palestinians and Israelis—a move that was immediately opposed by the Arabs. Nevertheless, in spite of the Arabs

opposition in May 14, 1948, Israel was declared a state. Soon after Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq attacked Israel, marking the beginning of the Arab-Israeli War.

The Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (PLO)

In 1957, Yasser Arafat recruited a group of Palestinian dissidents in Jordan and in 1959 created a paramilitary organization he called "FATHA" and in 1964 the PLO was formed. This organization was created initially as a political organization to form a multi-national alliance against Israel. However, unlike Irgun Zvai Leumi, the PLO attacks were intentionally directed against civilian targets.

In 1970, King Hussein of Jordan, after many warnings to the PLO of not launching attacks against Israel from Jordanian territory, forced Arafat and the PLO out of the country. Arafat was forced to relocate in Southern Lebanon.

Terrorism and the Media

Terrorists' acts are characterized by their psychological impact on the population, as well as the influence that it has over specific sectors of the population or target audience. These acts are designed to influence people way beyond their intended victims.

Many studies have established the link between terrorism and television. In 1977; Cooper—a reporter and analyst—was the first to state that terrorist acts are dramas tailor made for television. Terrorists know that the only thing that can interrupt a televised event is another event a lot more dramatic. This means that part of the terrorists' strategy to reach the public and the specific sectors of the population is a super dramatic terrorist act.

The events that transpired during the 1972 Munich Olympics confirm the aforementioned statement. The Olympics were being televised all over the world, no other event enjoyed such large coverage; however, 8 terrorists managed to capture the worlds attention by kidnapping and later assassinating members of Israel's Olympic Team. People see terrorists as a group of lunatics, fanatics that commit irrational acts driven by impulse. Well nothing could be further from the truth. Well-adjusted people that employ what is known as the *Operational Cycle* to plan and execute their acts conduct terrorist acts. Said procedures were instrumental in the attack at the Munich Olympics. The Operational Cycle consists of the following steps:

- Nominating multiple objectives
- Surveillance of the objectives
- Selection of the objective
- Surveillance and planning
- Rehearsal
- Actions on the objective
- Escape

In this case, the objective selected were the members of Israel's Olympic team. The leader of the cell Luttif "Issa" Afif and Yusuf "Tony" Nazzal conducted surveillance and reconnaissance of the objective with the assistance of members of the East German delegation. The surveillance allowed the terrorists to the location where the Israeli athletes were staying (31 Connollystrasse), the security personnel and security procedures as well as the type of clothing worn by the athletes and security personnel; they were also able to identify places along the security fence around the Olympic village that could be used to obtain access.

The information gathered was then utilized to develop a plan of action. And on September 5, 1972 at about 5:00 AM; eight terrorists—member of the Black September Organization—gained access to the village, and to the residence where the athletes from Israel were staying, in the process they killed two of them and captured nine. And at about 7:40 AM; the terrorists issued their demands. They demanded the release of 232 Arab prisoners and 2 Germans and threatened with killing two of the Israeli hostages by noon if the demands were not met. The prime minister of Israel—Golda Meir—was contacted soon after; however, she refused to negotiate with the hostage takers.

The Organizer of the Olympic committee began negotiating with the terrorists to gain more time. The suspense for the demands was extended to 1:00 PM and later to 3:00 PM and finally to 5:00 PM. They were offered an unlimited amount of money in exchange for the hostages; however, the terrorists refused to accept.

On or about 2:00 PM police, dressed as cooks, delivered food to the crisis site with the intent to gain access to the building and collect much needed information on the terrorists; however, they were forced to leave the food near the building. In the mean time, members of the press managed to gain access to the crisis area. At about 4:30 PM; the terrorists allow one of the hostages to talk to the press and later allowed one German official to enter the building and see the hostages.

In anticipation of the worst situation, the authorities decided to conduct a tactical assault. As Germany did not have a counter-terrorist force, they identified 38 policemen that have had qualified with their weapons and they formed the assault force. On or about 5:00 PM, the 38 Policemen dressed like athletes and carrying their weapons inside gym bags, surrounded the crisis point and prepared to conduct a tactical entry when the authorities realize the terrorists were watching the entire mission on television.

These actions precipitated new demands from the terrorists. This time they requested an aircraft that would transport them and the hostages to an Arab country. The German authorities offered a "Lufthansa 727" in the Furstenfeidbruck airport –a military base. Nevertheless, they did not intend to let the terrorists leave with nine athletes.

The terrorists decided to use the underground transportation system to move to the area where two helicopters were to pick them up. The authorities saw this as an

opportunity to set a trap and deployed a number of policemen along the route to set up and ambush. However, the terrorists decided to conduct reconnaissance of the route and detected the trap. Consequently, instead of walking to the helicopters they demanded a bus. The terrorists rejected the first bus and demanded a second one, which took them to the helicopters. For the first time the authorities realize that, there were eight terrorists instead of five, as initially believed. However, this information was never provided to the rescue force that was setting a trap at the airport.

In the meantime, the authorities started organizing an assault against the bus; however, the mission was canceled as the police lacked the necessary experience and training to pull it off. Finally the terrorists boarded the helicopters and departed to the airport. The German police saw the airfield as their last opportunity to rescue the hostages. They deployed five snipers on top of the airport building, one at ground level directly across from the others and four police officers dressed as the flight crew in the airplane. In addition, they also deployed a ground assault element about a mile away from the airport that was to help secure the hostages. A few seconds prior to the terrorists arriving at the airport the police officers inside the plane decided they were not trained for this kind of operations took a vote and arbitrarily left the aircraft. As the terrorists arrived, they went on to check the aircraft and when they realized it was not manned, they returned to the helicopters screaming in anger. As the terrorists returned to the helicopter the snipers opened fire and managed to hit one terrorist. The battle went on for approximately two hours. During which time the reinforcement were not able to reach the crisis site because the roads leading to it were jammed with personnel and vehicles from the press.

At one point, a terrorist threw a hand grenade into one of the helicopters killing all the athletes inside and another terrorist opened fire with an automatic weapon killing the rest of the Israelis. At the end of the battle one police officer, five terrorists, and all the hostages were dead. Three of the terrorists survived the ordeal.

Contributing factors

The lack of adequate basic security measures such as; no registration of personnel entering the village, lack of properly armed security personnel at the village, uniforms easily to identify, lack of physical security obstacles (security fence approx 6'tall) and no contingency plan. The lack of crisis management procedures, communications and lack of operational planning procedures for crisis situations were some of the areas that were neglected and contributed to the massacre. An example of the aforementioned was the personnel negotiating for the life of the athletes were not trained in negotiations techniques or procedures.

At the tactical level the lack of interoperability and cooperation between the organizing committee and the local authorities allowed the terrorists easy access to the village and consequently to their assassination.

Pictures of the dead Israeli athletes and the helicopter destroyed by the terrorists as a direct consequence of the lack of adequate security *(photos from the documentary "One Day in September.")*

Lessons Learned from Other Olympics

The Olympic Community has applied the lessons learned from the Munich experience. Since that incident security has become a very relevant issue. The bottom line is that to achieve the reestablishment of tranquility and peace of mind of the public in general ***"IS THE TRUE GOAL OF SECURITY MEASURES."***

> *"Mayagüez 2010 is a very important event not only for the city but also for Puerto Rico. This is a project that will advance better conditions and receive visitors from other countries that will go back and recommend it to others. For that reason, we want to see a more secure Mayagüez, a more secure world."*
>
> *Doctor Jorge I. Vélez Arocho*
> *University of Puerto Rico in Mayagüez (RUM)*

The Los Angeles Games

One of the lessons learned in the Los Angeles Games is the importance of background checks and investigations of all workers to include volunteer personnel.

According to Mr. Ed Moreno—Assistant Director fro Domestic Operations of the Diplomatic Security Services of the US State Department—due to the fact that many of the background investigations were not completed on time, many of the persons, including personnel assigned to critical positions were people that had been convicted of crimes such as sexual offends. Consequently, the crime rate of the games was the highest of any other in history.

Atlanta Olympics 1996

Athletes were not the only ones that were expected to give stellar performances during the games. The *Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games* (ACOG)," was assigned the security of 14,000 athletes and 2 millions spectators in 9 different venues.

Security personnel armed and trained in the use of *"PEPER SPRAY"*

Federal agents, local and state Police in uniform and armed

Federal agents, local and state Police armed and in civilian clothing

Their greatest challenge was to balance well trained security personnel with friendly attitude towards the public. All security personnel were expected to be tactful with the public as humanly possible. The majority of the security personnel were unarmed; however, highly trained in control measures. Others were armed with *"PEPER SPRAY"*—these were located in exterior areas with easy access to the venues. Armed local and state police as well as armed federal agents–in uniform and civilian clothing—were deployed to all events as were tactical police units for special circumstances.

Members of the tactical Unit of the Puerto Rico Police Department in Mayaguez (S.O.R.T.) responding to simulated hostage situation during the 4th CONCID Congress.

However, even the aforementioned measures were not enough. The Olympic Village consisted of nine different locations each one with unique security requirements, which in turn made it necessary to develop individual plans for each one of them. In order to help mitigate the risk, technical surveillance equipment (Speed Dome 360 degrees) was installed along the perimeter fence as well as access control measures, registration and scanning.

There is no doubt the aforementioned measures did the trick in securing the athletes. However, athletes are not the only sector of the population that needs to protection. Places of gathering on where members of the different delegations, visitors from different countries and the general public go to celebrate, attend concerts etc. are also likely targets of terrorism.

Bomb Attack at the Centennial Park

Eric Robert Rudolph's actions are testimony to the assertion that places of gathering are also likely targets for terrorists.

Nagano Winter Olympics

In the case of Nangano, it was not the terrorist threat that almost did away with the event, but rather health problems. The combination of terrible weather, confined quarters and the brake out of the flu, kept a number of athletes from achieving their best performances as well as large number of the public away from the event. This situation stresses the impotence and the need of establishing a public health system with the capacity to detect and contain the spread of infectious diseases. The correct answer to this type of situations is a health plan that stresses vigilance and monitoring with the

capacity to analyze biological and chemical samples in the event's grounds and adjacent areas.

Salt Lake City Winter Olympics

The security model of the Atlanta was modified with the intent of mitigating the risks to the public during celebrations. Said modifications included; the designation of consolidated places of mass gathering. They only sponsor the events they were able to secure properly and the development of an Information Dissemination Plan that among other things determined how much security related information could be released to the media as well as a redundant communications plan."

Athens Olympics

In Athens the security plan was a modified version of the one in Salt Lake City. The modifications became necessary when professional athletes refused to stay in the Olympic Village and instead stayed in five stars hotels making it impossible to keep them in a consolidated area and requiring the re-evaluation and modification of the security plan. The new plan included additional measures such as additional well-armed uniform police. Greece however, counted with the advantage of having a National Police with centralized control, which facilitated coordination without having to worry about jurisdictional issues.

Other Security Considerations

Terror Espontáneo

Terrorist acts come in many ways. An example of this phenomenon is what is known as Spontaneous Terrorism. This term is used to describe incidents such as the Snow Ball incident in "Giants Stadium" in 1995, the beer bottle war in "Cleveland Browns" game in 2001, and the fans attack against the coaches and officials in "Comiskey Park/U.S. Cellular Field."

Special Security Requirements

If we prepare for the worst, everything else is gravy. Therefore, any security plan that is worth the paper is written on must also include dignitary and VP's protection measures as well as the protection of delegations from some specific countries such as the United States, Cuba, Israel, etc.

Factors to consider in Planning for Special Events Security

- Is there a plan—Integrated and coordinated—adopted by all entities involved in security.
- Is there a clear and defined *Chain of Command*?
- Are there ongoing aggressive Intelligence Operations Efforts?
- Are there *Information Dissemination Procedures* that determine the criterion for personnel with the need to know?
- Have said procedures been rehearsed and exercised?
- Are there *Communications Procedures* and have they been disseminated to all concerned personnel?
- Have security procedures been developed for places of mass gathering and celebrations?
- Is there a plan to monitor health situations and deal with health issues?
- Is there a response plan for medical personnel and services in the case of a mass casualty event?"
- *Has it been rehearsed?*
- Has security measures been established for all event venues, transportation systems, the Olympic Village and hotels. Does it include background investigation of all workers to include volunteers?
- Are there tactical plans?
- Who is responsible for them?
- Does the units have the necessary training and expertise to conduct this type of operations whether it is unliterary or in conjunction with other units?
- Has this units rehearsed all possible scenarios in the specific locations?

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
George Santayana

"The last one charges it to the devil" … is not the preferred attitude when it comes to security. The bottom line is that everything that can go wrong probably will … Leaving things to chance is a course of action, however, not one that one should relay upon when it comes to security … Hopefully we have learned the lessons from past events!

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